acss-digest

Sixty-one years ago, the African continent swore a promise it has never fully kept: that no people would be handed to a foreign power without their own consent. On the weekend of November 1, that promise got a little thinner. The UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, MINURSO, ran out of mandate at midnight on Saturday. The Security Council had spent Friday failing to renew it. The United States put forward a draft resolution, and Russia vetoed it. A rival Russian text could not even gather the nine votes it needed. So the mission that was supposed to oversee a referendum on self-determination simply stopped.
Ask yourself who gains from a vacuum like that. Then ask who pays for it.
The answer to the second question is the Sahrawi people. Some live under Moroccan administration in the territory Rabat controls. Others have lived for decades in refugee camps near Tindouf, in Algeria, where generations have grown up under tents and rationed aid while the world debated their future in committee rooms. Their right to vote was written into the 1991 ceasefire that created MINURSO. That referendum never happened. Three decades later, the ballot box is still a rumour, and now the mission meant to chase it has been shut down.
Secretary-General António Guterres says the expiry "does not abrogate" the Sahrawi people's inalienable right to self-determination. Good. Words matter. But words do not patrol a border, count votes, or document abuses. For years MINURSO has been criticised for lacking a mandate to monitor human rights, which meant that the only UN peacekeeping force on the ground in a disputed territory could not formally report on what happened to the people it was supposed to protect. Now it is gone entirely. The UN says it will keep working through its Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura. We have heard that before. Envoys come and go. Refugees stay.
Let us be precise about what we are watching. Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council that presents itself as the champion of sovereignty, used its veto to block a text on a mission designed to protect a people's right to choose their own future. Washington, which has its own record of shifting positions on this file, is also part of the same paralysis. Paris, Madrid, Rabat, Algiers, and the African capitals whose ambassadors sit quietly in New York all shaped the outcome. And the people whose right is at stake were not in the room.
Now look east. In the same news cycle, Uganda announced that it has begun pulling its troops out of Somalia after nearly two decades. Kampala was the first African country to send soldiers under the African Union Mission in Somalia, AMISOM, when it was created in 2007 to shield Somalia's transitional government from al-Shabaab. Ugandan forces did real work. They helped drive al-Shabaab out of Mogadishu and other major towns, and fought beside the Somali National Army to take back strategic ground. Ugandan mothers buried sons for that work, and we should say so plainly. Uganda's acting army spokesperson says all forces, including those under the AU banner, will be out by the end of 2027.
But a withdrawal is not a victory unless someone can hold the ground after the boots leave. Somalia still faces al-Shabaab, still struggles with fragile institutions, and still depends heavily on external money to pay its soldiers. An exit timetable is only responsible if the Somali state is ready to stand on its own. Nobody has yet shown us that it is.
The pattern across both stories is the same. Great powers use the Security Council as a bargaining table. Regional bodies offer statements where they should offer strategy. Africa's own leaders treat sovereignty as a slogan when it suits them and a burden when it does not. In Kampala, Museveni has been in power since 1986. In 2005, Uganda's parliament removed the presidential age limit from the constitution. A government that dismantles its own checks on power has very little standing to lecture others on self-determination, and yet Uganda's soldiers have spent years abroad, from Somalia to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The International Court of Justice found in 2022 that Uganda had committed serious violations during its occupation of Congolese territory and ordered it to pay the DRC $325 million in reparations. Uganda's exit from Somalia should not be treated as a clean story of peacekeeping success. It must also be a moment to ask why an African army spent two decades in other people's countries while its own democracy was narrowing.
So what should happen?
For Western Sahara, the Security Council must not let this stand as a final verdict. It should commission an urgent, independent assessment of human rights conditions in the territory and in the Tindouf camps, and it should fund a monitoring presence that reports directly to the Secretary-General, even if it lacks a full peacekeeping mandate. The African Union should appoint its own special envoy with a clear brief to press for a credible, time-bound process, whether that ends in a referendum or in a negotiated autonomy arrangement that is actually negotiated with Sahrawi representatives and subject to independent oversight. Morocco's autonomy offer deserves serious examination, but autonomy that has no free press, no independent courts, and no international observers is just a different kind of control. Good governance is not a gift from the strong to the weak. It is a minimum.
For Somalia, the withdrawal must be tied to a real plan. The Somali government should be required to show verifiable progress on funding and training its own forces, on transparent payment systems, on credible elections, and on the rule of law. Botswana has shown what disciplined institutions and sound public finance can do. Mauritius has built one of the most stable democracies and economies on the continent by protecting property rights and independent courts. Senegal, after its 2024 transfer of power through the ballot box, proved again that African voters will not accept rulers who try to stay forever. These are the templates. Somalia and every other fragile state should be measured against them, not against the convenience of foreign donors.
And citizens must demand more. In Rabat, in Algiers, in Kampala, in Mogadishu, in Addis Ababa and Abuja and Nairobi, ask your leaders one question: what is your position on a free and fair process for the Sahrawi people, and how will you prove that Somalia can defend itself before your soldiers come home? Ask your parliaments to publish their troop deployments and their costs. Ask your journalists to go to Tindouf and to the areas under contested administration. Ask your civil society groups to document abuses no matter whose flag flies over the territory.
We cannot keep outsourcing our conscience to the Security Council. When Russia blocks a mission and the West shrugs, that is not a geopolitical mystery. It is a choice made in rooms where African voices are invited only as footnotes. The only way to change that is to speak loudly enough, and often enough, that no government can pretend the silence is acceptable.
The UN mission in Western Sahara has ended. The Sahrawi people's right to decide their future has not. Neither has the responsibility of every African government to stand for it. Demand the vote. Demand the monitors. Demand that every soldier leaving Somalia leaves behind a state strong enough to stand on its own. History will record whether we did.
Based on reporting by ACSS-EMAIL