Building Trust to Buttress Senegal Against the Growing Threat of Violent Extremism

Senegal’s experience from the Casamance reveals that security agencies’ trust-building with local communities is a vital practical means of gaining cooperation and preempting mobilization to violence.

A Senegalese soldier questions a man at an artisanal gold mining site near the Malian border. (Photo: AFP/Amaury Falt-Brown)

Dozens of fuel tankers traveling from Senegal have been attacked and set on fire in western Mali since the militant Islamist coalition Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) launched an offensive in July 2025 toshut down key economic arteriessupporting Bamako and other populated areas in southern Mali. These sustained and systematic attacks have brought the militant insurgency to the border of neighboring Senegal. An assault on the customs post in Diboli, Mali, took place less than 1 km from Kidira, Senegal—a 2-minute walk to the border at the Falémé River. Kayes, the regional hub in western Mali and the focal point of the attacks, is only 100 km from the Senegalese border. Many of the fuel trucks and other traffic that have been attacked originate in Senegal.

The challenge Senegal now faces is how to prevent overlapping pressures—militant proximity, criminal networks, and social strain—from hardening into an entrenched security threat.

The deterioration of security in western Mali has prompted Dakar to elevate eastern Senegal to a top security priority. In response,the Senegalese government has expanded its military footprintin the region, including establishing one of the country’s largest military bases in Goudiry. This has been accompanied by the deployment of rapid intervention gendarmerie units known as Groupe d’Action Rapide pour la Surveillance et l’Intervention (GARSI), which have bases in nearby Kidira,Saïensoutou, Moussala, and Médina Bafé.

The growing security pressures are compounded by the displacement of an estimated 20,000 people from the Sahel into eastern Senegal, placing additional strain on already vulnerable border communities. Eastern Senegal is also shaped by longstandingcross-border organized criminal activitythat further complicates the security environment. Arms trafficking linked to illegal gold mining and drug transit routes operate across the porous borders connecting Senegal, Mali, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.

Cross-border markets like Médina Gounass and Diaobé have long facilitated these flows, with motorbike taxi drivers (“Jakarta men”) and other opportunistic actors blurring the lines between illicit economies and everyday livelihoods. Although these networks are not inherently violent, they increase exposure to exploitation by militant groups seeking access, financing, or freedom of movement if left unmanaged.

The challenge Senegal now faces is how to prevent these overlapping pressures—militant proximity, criminal networks, and social strain—from hardening into an entrenched security threat. This is not a question of reacting to an insurgency that has already taken root, but preventing one from emerging in the first place.

Senegal’s experience in Casamance offers instructive lessons for how trust-based engagement between communities and security forces can help contain emerging risks.

Distrust has long sustained insecurity in the Casamance, enabling illicit economies that funded the separatist group, the Mouvement des Forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), and deepened local vulnerabilities. The war economy that emerged alongside the separatist conflict entrenched drug and timber trafficking as well as large-scale cattle theft.

Casamance, in southern Senegal and separated from the rest of the country by The Gambia, has experienced one of West Africa’s longest-running low-intensity conflicts. Home to roughly 1.5 million people (10–12 percent of Senegal’s population), the Casamance differs from the Sahelian north in its agrarian economy and greater religious and ethnic diversity. Grievances linked to political and economic marginalization escalated in the early 1980s when protests were met with state force, contributing to the emergence of the Mouvement des Forces démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) and a separatist insurgency that peaked in the 1990s. The conflict evolved into a protracted confrontation marked by intermittent ceasefires and localized violence.

Over time, the conflict displaced an estimated 150,000 people, with tens of thousands remaining internally displaced in The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau. Violence has included guerrilla attacks, banditry, and clashes between armed factions and state forces, particularly in forested border areas.

A 2022 accord and a February 2025 peace agreement with the principal MFDC faction introduced amnesty and reintegration measures, reinforcing broader de-escalation. Although not all factions have signed on, these developments—alongside sustained stabilization efforts—have significantly reduced insecurity across much of the region.

These illicit activities thrived in a conflict environment marked by weak communication and limited collaboration between communities and the defense and security forces, particularly along the borders with The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea. Criminal networks routinely exploited local knowledge and social ties, relying on community-based lookouts and early warning to evade detection. In practice, this meant that crimes such as organized cattle theft and timber trafficking could be conducted with relative impunity in border areas where enforcement was sporadic and distrust of the security forces was high.

Where communication is limited and trust is weak, early warning breaks down, cooperation falters, and security responses tend to be reactive rather than preventive.

Misperceptions and mistrust further compounded these dynamics. Many communities had a limited understanding of the distinct roles of the police, gendarmerie, and army. Thus, negative experiences with enforcement were often generalized across all security actors. In this context, reporting criminal activity was widely viewed as a breach of community solidarity. A culture of silence took hold, reinforced by fear of reprisal from armed criminal groups. Incidents were frequently reported late—or not at all—reducing the ability of security forces to intervene effectively. In Goudomp, for example, residents acknowledged that cattle thefts were at times reported only the following morning, giving armed perpetrators ample time to flee across the border into Guinea-Bissau.

Residents in many communities had little direct contact with the gendarmerie or army during attacks by the MFDC or other criminal groups.

Senegal’s experience in the Casamance illustrates that one of the central challenges in preventing the escalation of insecurity in border regions is not simply the presence of armed groups or criminal networks, but the quality ofthe relationships between communities and the security services. Where communication is limited and trust is weak, early warning breaks down, cooperation falters, and security responses tend to be reactive rather than preventive. These populations may also be easier to radicalize.

It is in this space that the Justice Security Dialogue (JSD) has proven to be a particularly effective tool. Launched in the Casamance in 2019,JSD is a trust-building programthat brings together community members, civil society organizations, security personnel, and government officials to jointly identify and address local security challenges. Rather than focusing on enforcement alone, the approach emphasizes dialogue, shared problem-solving, and adaptation to local conditions. In many cases, JSD forums represent the first time that community leaders and security forces engage directly and constructively around security priorities.

One of the central challenges in preventing the escalation of insecurity in border regions is the quality of the relationships between communities and the security services tasked with protecting them.

Through facilitated dialogue sessions, participants identify the most pressing security concerns in their communities, select problems that can be addressed locally, and develop practical responses with the involvement of security services. These initiatives are then assessed collectively, allowing stakeholders to adjust approaches, expand participation, and gradually share responsibility for leading the dialogue process. Over time, this iterative model has helped restore confidence and establish more predictable, respectful relationships between communities and security agencies.

During the first JSD sessions, security personnel shared their direct phone numbers with community leaders—a simple but significant gesture that participants consistently cited as a turning point in improving collaboration. The absence of reliable communication channels had been a major barrier to effective security cooperation. In response, the initiative supported the creation and distribution of contact books containing comprehensive contact information for security forces, civil protection services, local authorities, and community leaders. The widespread availability of these contact books strengthened community confidence and made reporting incidents easier and more routine. Their practical usefulness quickly became evident, and demand for the contact books soon spread throughout Goudomp Department.

The JSD process brought about a measurable change in the security environment in the Casamance. This shift became evident within a few months of the initial dialogue sessions and reflected a growing sense of shared responsibility for local security. As confidence improved, communities became more willing to engage proactively with security forces, providing information that helped prevent incidents rather than merely respond to them.

A dialogue session in Goudomp District. (Photo: Author)

These shifts were reflected in community perceptions and behavior. Comparative survey data from Goudomp indicate that more than 80 percent of respondents viewed their neighborhoods as safe and reported improvements in crime in the year following the launch of the JSD. Trust in security actors—including the gendarmerie and army—also rose. Notably, communities increasingly addressed security concerns through local channels, suggesting a normalization of security provision and reduced reliance on national forces.

In Goudomp, the dialogue process also helped reshape relations between local authorities and security services. Prior to the JSD, the mayor’s office had little interaction with the gendarmerie. The first structured exchange between the deputy mayor and the gendarmerie—facilitated through JSD—revealed that the local gendarmerie post was in disrepair, prompting municipal support for its renovation. As a result, residents were able to access basic legal and notarial services locally rather than traveling more than 50 km through unsafe terrain, reinforcing perceptions of the government as a practical provider of security and services.

In late 2020, the local brigade commander reported a marked increase in the number of residents who reported incidents, denounced criminal activity, or assisted the gendarmerie in addressing public safety concerns.

As confidence was gradually restored, structured local frameworks for dialogue and action emerged to coordinate responses among communities, local authorities, and security forces. Dialogue Committees—supported by clear action plans and real-time communication channels such as shared messaging groups—became focal points for cooperation. Six such committees were established across the three regions of the Casamance, formally recognized by communal decrees and approved by prefects. These bodies played a critical role in mediating disputes, preserving social cohesion, and preventing the escalation of intercommunal, political, and electoral violence, particularly during periods of heightened tension between 2022 and 2024.

Security initiatives in the Casamance proved most resilient when communities were actively involved in shaping responses rather than treated solely as recipients of enforcement.

The practical effects of this shift extended beyond improved local security, offering lessons for how border communities can manage risk and prevent escalation in similarly exposed regions. In Goudomp, for example, a gendarme suggested improving market security in response to robbery complaints that had been raised. The JSD committee met with the market organizers and the mayor to increase the number of guards on market day. The committee also initiated cooperation between youth vigilance groups, who could contact the gendarmerie 24/7 with any issues. The initiative brought together the mayor’s office, the prefect, the army commander, and the chief of the gendarmerie post, and contributed to a reduction in armed robberies. The broad-based support and buy-in reflect how sustained dialogue helped align a community initiative with an official security response.

In Djibanar, a commune with more than 20 displaced villages due to the conflict, municipal authorities financed committee-led initiatives that brought together security forces and community representatives along the border of the Casamance with Guinea-Bissau. These engagements strengthened cross-border coordination—particularly around organized cattle theft, which had long impoverished local populations and heightened their exposure to insecurity. Together, these experiences demonstrate how community-driven solutions anchored in regular engagement with security authorities and institutional partnerships can produce security responses that are both relevant and durable.

The community of Médina Gounass (Photo: screen capture)

These processes can also be applied across borders. Violence stemming fromlong-standing rivalries between two Muslim communities in Médina Gounassin June 2024 resulted in one death and carried the risk of cross-border escalation involving Fulani groups from Guinea-Bissau. The swift intervention of local authorities in Senegal and the Governor of Gabu, Guinea-Bissau, helped de-escalate tensions by persuading local leaders to retract inflammatory statements that had temporarily closed the border. Supported by the introduction of a JSD project, this response demonstrated how empowered local authorities and cross-border coordination can contain violence before it spreads.

Evidence from eastern Senegal suggests that distrust between communities and security forces remains a binding constraint.

There are important differences between the Casamance and eastern Senegal that caution direct replication. The Casamance has been shaped by decades of separatist conflict and post-conflict peacebuilding, whereas eastern Senegal faces emerging risks linked to regional instability, climate pressures, and transnational threats. Both regions, however, share key structural features such as proximity to porous borders, exposure to cross-border trafficking, and histories of strained relations between communities and security forces. While eastern Senegal has not experienced sustained insurgent violence, it faces similar vulnerabilities that could be exploited if mistrust persists.

Evidence from eastern Senegal suggests that distrust between communities and security forces remains a binding constraint. A 2023 study in the village of Guémédji, Kédougou Region, found that many residents paradoxically associated the term “security” with law enforcement actors, whom local communities perceived as a source of insecurity. Such perceptions limit information sharing, weaken early warning, and increase the risk that local disputes escalate unchecked.

Senegalese soldiers patrol an artisanal mining community near the Malian border. (Photo: AFP/Amaury Falt-Brown)

These experiences suggest that preventive security in eastern Senegal will depend on sustained community engagement and context-specific adaptation. Such mechanisms—combining regular dialogue, clearer role differentiation among police, gendarmerie, and military actors, and locally anchored early warning—offer a template for strengthening preventive capacity. Adapting these approaches in eastern Senegal to border dynamics, including cross-border coordination among local authorities, could help identify and manage risks before they escalate into more entrenched threats.

The experience of defense and security forces in the Casamance underscores that preventive security depends as much on relationships with communities as on force deployments. Even where security forces are present, weak communication, distrust, or simple misunderstanding can undermine early warning and limit operational effectiveness. As violent extremist groups and criminal networks exert increasing pressure on border communities in eastern Senegal, security actors will need to adapt by strengthening preventive mechanisms and building sustained ties with vulnerable populations in these borderlands.

Prefect meeting in Goudomp with Mayor and Local Gendarmerie Chief. (Photo: Author)

The Casamance demonstrates how JSD engagements helped establish predictable channels of interaction between communities and security services, enabling information to flow before threats escalated. When adapted to local conditions, similar approaches could help eastern Senegal proactively strengthen both its defensive posture and community resilience against emerging risks. Prevention, in this sense, is not simply a matter of posture or presence, but of sustained engagement that allows risks to be identified early and addressed collaboratively through inclusive dialogue and cooperative problem-solving.

Bringing security forces and communities together in the Casamance also revealed that trust functions as an operational enabler. Improved communications and clarified roles—supported by robust local security frameworks—reduced the culture of silence that had allowed criminal networks, and historically separatist militants, to operate with relative impunity. As confidence was restored, communities became more willing to report incidents and cooperate with security forces, directly strengthening situational awareness and response. For practitioners, this underscores that trust-building is not an abstract governance objective but a concrete means of improving intelligence, responsiveness, and deterrence.

The experience in the Casamance underscores that preventive security depends as much on relationships with communities as on force deployments.

Security initiatives in the Casamance proved most resilient when communities were actively involved in shaping responses rather than treated solely as recipients of enforcement. Direct engagement between security forces and decision-making authorities—at both local (prefects and mayors) and national (governors and ministry) levels—helped generate greater coherence in security responses. Dialogue Committees and locally anchored coordination mechanisms aligned community initiatives with institutional authority, reinforcing legitimacy and sustaining cooperation over time. Institutionalizing these practices reduced reliance on ad hoc enforcement and contributed to more stable security outcomes in areas affected by long-standing insecurity.

The Casamance experience illustrates the importance of adaptation rather than replication. Leaders within the military, gendarmerie, and police have highlighted the practical value of JSD in activity reports, noting that insights from the process contributed directly to adjustments in military and law enforcement programming. Eastern Senegal faces different dynamics, including growing cross-border pressures and increasing exposure to insurgent violence. Applying trust-based approaches, such as JSD, therefore requires sensitivity to local conditions and early engagement rather than wholesale transfer of post-conflict models. For Senegal’s defense and security forces, the central implication is that prevention works best when it anticipates risk, empowers authorities and communities, and integrates cross-border coordination before crises harden into entrenched threats.

Boucar Baba Ndiayeserved as country coordinator for the Justice and Security Dialogue in Senegal with more than a decade of experience in the Casamance.

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Based on reporting by ACSS