think-tank

Every year, the heads of state of Southern Africa stand before cameras and promise us a region that trades, builds and moves together. Every year, the communiqué is long, the language is noble, and the roads between our capitals remain clogged with trucks waiting days at borders that should have been open a decade ago. How many more summits will we sit through before someone asks the question that matters: where is the money?
The Africa Center for Strategic Studies has put the problem plainly. Industrialisation, infrastructure and regional integration sit at the centre of the Southern African Development Community's agenda, and none of them can happen without deeper economic integration. That is not a slogan. It is arithmetic. A factory in Lusaka needs power from Kariba, components from Johannesburg, and buyers in Lubumbashi. When the power is unreliable, the components are stuck at the border, and the buyers have been lost to cheaper imports from Asia, the factory never opens. The young engineer who should have run its shift leaves for Dubai, Toronto or London. We lose the factory, we lose the engineer, and we lose the argument that Africa can build for itself.
Consider what the region already has on paper. SADC has sixteen member states, a combined population of well over 350 million people, and some of the richest mineral deposits on earth: copper in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, cobalt that powers the world's batteries, lithium in Zimbabwe, gas off Mozambique's coast, and hydropower potential that could light the whole subcontinent. Yet intra-regional trade remains stubbornly small, a fraction of what it should be for a bloc with this much natural wealth. Our goods leave Africa raw and return as finished products at a markup, while our own markets stay fragmented by tariffs, paperwork and corruption at checkpoints. Every truck delayed for three days at a border is a tax on the poor, paid in spoiled tomatoes and higher bread prices in Harare, Lilongwe and Maputo.
The financing gap is the sharpest edge of this failure. The African Development Bank and other continental institutions have long estimated Africa's infrastructure financing needs in the range of well over one hundred billion dollars a year, with only a fraction met from public budgets. Regional projects that cross borders, the kind that actually integrate markets, are the hardest to fund because no single government wants to pay for a bridge or a power line that serves its neighbours. So the money goes where it always goes: to projects with a single owner, a single flag and a single set of creditors who expect repayment in hard currency, often on terms that leave our parliaments reading contracts they never saw.
And make no mistake, the suitors are lining up. China has rehabilitated railways and built roads with loans that our finance ministers must repay in dollars, whether the projects earn them or not. Gulf states buy ports, farmland and influence. Turkey sells drones and builds bases. Russia offers security guarantees to regimes that have lost the consent of their own people. Western governments and their development banks, to their credit, are now competing for Africa's critical minerals, through initiatives like the US and EU backing of the Lobito Corridor linking Zambia's copper belt to the Atlantic. Competition is not the problem. The problem is that all of them come to the table asking what Africa can give them, and too few of our leaders ask what their deals will do to our sovereignty. This is the new scramble for Africa. The flags have changed. The extraction has not.
Nowhere is the cost of weak regional institutions clearer than in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a SADC member whose misery has become the bloc's most painful test. In 2023 SADC deployed a military mission to eastern Congo to help contain the M23 militia, and the mission was meant to show that Southern Africa could defend its own. It did not last. Funding was thin, the mandate was unclear, and the mission was reportedly drawn down in 2025 while the fighting continued. Meanwhile, the UN Group of Experts has documented for years, including in reports S/2025/446 and S/2026/466, the presence of Rwandan Defence Force units inside Congolese territory, directing and sustaining M23 operations. Let us name it accurately. This is a war of aggression against a sovereign neighbour, with M23 serving as a proxy in the same way Moscow used separatists in eastern Ukraine. Over a hundred thousand Congolese have been displaced in recent fighting alone, and the UN puts the total number of displaced people in the DRC in the millions. Mothers are burying children while regional summits talk about corridors.
If SADC cannot protect its own members, if it cannot fund its own missions, and if it cannot hold an aggressor to account, then its promises of industrialisation are fiction. Investors read this as risk. Ratings agencies read it as risk. And the young people of this region read it correctly as proof that their leaders will talk about the future while the present burns.
There are, however, African examples that prove a better path exists. Botswana built one of the most credible economies on the continent by protecting property rights, managing mineral revenues transparently and keeping its public institutions relatively independent. Mauritius became a diversified economy by investing in education, openness to trade and sound fiscal management. Zambia and Botswana opened the Kazungula Bridge in 2024, a practical reminder that when governments coordinate, concrete gets poured and goods cross. Rwanda has shown what disciplined economic planning can achieve, and we must celebrate that record while condemning, without apology, the military adventures that stain it. Development without democracy and rule of law is a loan that someone else will one day collect.
So what must happen? First, SADC must create a credible regional financing vehicle, with pooled guarantees, transparent project selection and public debt limits that parliaments can actually enforce. Second, the bloc must implement the free movement of goods and people that its own protocols already promise, starting with one-stop border posts, mutual recognition of standards and an end to the bribe-driven delays that strangle small traders. Third, the SADC Tribunal, suspended since 2010 after it ruled against a sitting government's land seizures, must be fully restored, so that citizens and businesses have a court where the powerful can be sued. Without an independent judiciary, every investment agreement is a gamble. Fourth, the region must set a hard standard that any aggression against a member state triggers collective response and sanctions, not polite statements.
And we, the citizens of this region, have a role that no summit can perform for us. We must demand that our finance ministers publish every loan agreement and every mining contract in full, with the names of beneficiaries disclosed. We must demand that our parliaments refuse to ratify deals signed in secret. We must demand that our governments stop trading our children's future for short-term political survival.
Ask yourself the question our leaders keep avoiding. When the next SADC communiqué arrives, promising trains, power and factories, will you accept another decade of paper promises? Or will you hold them to the account they owe us? The money exists. The minerals exist. The talent exists. What is missing is the will to put the public interest above the convenience of whoever is holding the contract. That will is ours to demand, and we must demand it now.
Based on reporting by SAIIA