Overcoming Challenges to Reform the African Union

African governments and citizens must decide what kind of union Africa needs to meet its aspiration of a regional body that advances peace, expands prosperity, and effectively represents African interests in international forums.

Logo of the African Union displayed at the regional body’s headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. (Photo: AFP/Amanuel Sileshi)

The African Union (AU) has been criticized for a lack of robust leadership on major crises like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the two Sudans, Cameroon, and the Sahel. The AU is likewise actively engaged with facilitating intercontinental economic integration to unblock unrealized synergies of expanding markets and trade within this continent of 54 countries and 1.5 billion people. Africans, moreover, look to the AU to provide a compelling and collective voice to represent African interests in international forums or when swift and coordinated African responses are required.

The panoply of issues on which the AU is expected to provide leadership and coordination underscores the importance of this pan-African body. Yet, progress on longstanding calls for AU reforms on peace and security, improving organizational efficiency, economic cooperation, and global representation has been protracted.

Any discussion on AU reforms must appreciate the magnitude of the task. The AU’s predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), was a compromise between two groups of newly independent states. The “Casablanca Group” wanted an immediate political union of African countries, with a single authority, subsidiary regional governments, a common foreign and defense policy, and common institutions. The “Monrovia Group” wanted a looser alliance based on gradual regional economic cooperation and national sovereignty.

The AU has an opportunity to become a more effective, influential, and institutionally sound continental political union.

These fundamental differences live on in the AU, affecting its ability to build consensus on key issues, including peace and security. A lot of the tension centers on how much national sovereignty members must cede to a more empowered Union, with some more willing than others. Consider the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA), established in 2018. It moves Africafrom regional economic cooperation toward deep economic integrationas envisioned in the Casablanca Group doctrine. However, implementation of a customs union and removal of nontariff barriers has been slow, indicatinghow much primacy members are putting on national sovereignty.

There are similar tensions over technocratic and political reforms. One school of thought argues that a focus solely on technical and administrative improvementscould turn the AU into a “technocratic bureaucracy”like the United Nations (UN). According to this view, what Africa needs instead is to realize the pan-African objectives laid out by the Founding Fathers. This entails an organization that marshals coordinated action from members, puts citizens at the fore, and asserts and defends African interests globally. The counter position is that while the AU badly needs a collective voice, it must firstfix its institutional malaise and paralysisto function and deliver better for Africa. The two schools of thought are not necessarily mutually exclusive—but shape the competing pressures for reform.

The overly dominant role of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government on the AU’s day-to-day functions is the source for some of the regional body’s institutional dysfunction. This is a legacy of the past. The OAU was formed in 1963, in the heat of bitter anticolonial wars, when only 34 African countries were independent. It hadtwo central missions: defend the independence of new states and coordinate the total decolonization of Africa by providing military support to over two dozen armed movements. These tasks dictated a centralized, largely secretive, and top-heavy structure vested in the Assembly. The transition to the AU started in 1994, after the fall of apartheid, with the opting for a more open, transparent, and decentralized structurereflecting fundamental changes in Africa.

The top-heavy OAU decision-making culture has persisted, however. Decisions are still largely vested in the Assembly of Heads of State, even though it typically only meets once a year. The African Union Commission (AUC), the secretariat responsible for implementing the AU’s agenda on a day-to-day basis is not fully empowered. The Pan-African Parliament, which should be elected by universal suffrage and have full legislative powers, remains consultative with no real power. The Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), which is meant to give voice to civil society organizations in AU decisions, is also consultative and advisory. TheAfrican Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, tasked with protecting human rights and reducing impunity, is similarly hamstrung, with limited enforcement capacity.

Pro-government youth militia members in Burundi chase protesters in Bujumbura in May 2015, while a member of the police (in blue) looks on. (Photo:AP/Berthier Mugiraneza)

The tension between the Assembly and the AU organs hampers the AU’s ability to respond to serious crises. The AU, for example, has fallen short of enforcing its longstanding rules on unconstitutional changes of government as shown by itsinconsistent responses to the coupsin Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Sudan. There have also been cases where decisions by key organs have been overturned by others.

An illustration is the December 2015 AU Peace and Security Council decision to deploy the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU) to reduce the escalating violence triggered by then President Pierre Nkurunziza’s bid for a constitutionally prohibited third term. This timely decision was overturned by the AU Assembly at its summit in January 2016. The Burundi government subsequently undertook thedismantling of the Arusha Accordsthat had guided the country in its recovery from the 1993-2005 civil war and Burundi has experienced persistent instability since. Thecircumvention of term limits in Burundi, moreover, opened the door for other African leaders to do the same, contributing to further strains on peace and security on the continent.

Part of the problem has to do with coordination challenges within the AU and limited capacity to follow up and implement key decisions—a carryover from the OAU. AU organs such as the Peace and Security Council, African Peer Review Mechanism, and ECOSOCCoften fail to coordinate their activities. This has similarly undermined the AU’s ability to speak with a coherent voice on critical issues.

The latest focal point for AU reform was launched in 2016. The AU assembled eminent Africans from government, private sector, civil society, academia, and international agencies to consult widely and prepare recommendations for an “urgent and necessary” institutional overhaul of the organization. Rwandan President Paul Kagame was appointed to coordinate the effort and provide a final report to the Assembly. Key findings and proposals were tabled at an extraordinary AU Heads of State and Government Summit in November 2018.

The following problems were identified:

A comprehensive reform proposal was proposed to address these challenges:

Then AU Commission Chair Moussa Faki Mahamat noted at the time that the AU’s limited ability to raise Africa’s collective voice and defend African interests globallycontinues to be a major challenge. Referring to instances where the AU failed to mount an effective and coordinated response that would be taken seriously at the international level, “Time is running out. We realize that the world is changing and individually we no longer mean anything…. The pace at which we’re doing things is not sufficient.”

Since that time, significantmilestones have been achieved, including appointing a new management team and directors, reducing the number of AU commissions and departments, introducing merit-based recruitment, enacting new policies on regional representation, and implementing a mandated skills audit. The governance structure of the AU Peace Fund, created to help the Union achieve self-sufficiency in financing peace and security operations, is fully operational. By 2024, it had raised 96 percent of the initial target of $400 million entirely from member contributions.

Significant hurdles remain, however.

Key Assembly decisions are still not being implemented due to a disconnect between the Assembly and the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), consisting of all member states and tasked with aligning the priorities of the Assembly with the work of the AUC. There is likewise a disconnect between the PRC and other AU organs, stemming in large part to overlapping authorities between the PRC and AUC.

Residents in the eastern DRC flee as the M23 rebel group seizes territory. (Photo: AFP)

The mandated skills audit has not been fully implemented, partly due to a hiring freeze in 2018 and infighting between member countries and the AU Commission, with some complaining that the process was manipulated to deny their citizens continued service, even though most passed the competency assessment. At the same time, the audits revealed damning findings ofnepotism, corruption, and unverified qualifications.

The reduction of the AUC from eight to six departments created organizational tensions over roles and responsibilities. Many criticized the merging of the Peace and Security with the Political Affairs Department,among them former South African President Thabo Mbeki, who warned that these departments had distinct functions. Putting them under one unit would dilute the AU’s responses to security crises and its political work in representing and defending African interests on the global stage.

Despite progress in financial self-sufficiency, some member states are not paying their dues on time, or at all. In the 2025 budget, member states covered 98 percent of the AU’s operational budget while donors (primarily European countries)financed 78 percent of the program budget. This continues to undermine the AU’s agency and ownership of its programs.

Former South African President Nelson Mandela attends event in support of the Pan African Parliament in 2006. (Photo: AFP/Fati Moalusi)

In afollow-up report to the Assembly of Heads of State and Governmentin February 2024, President Kagame cited the lack of political will and varied commitments among member states toward reform, urging them not to “pretend these differences do not exist” but to find middle ground. The report alluded to the overbearing role of the AU Assembly, noting that its agenda was top heavy, lengthy, and takes on issues that do not need consideration at the head-of-state level. Common institutions like the Pan-African Parliament and African Courtare unable to fulfil the functions laid out in the Constitutive Actdespite proposals to make them independent and granting them full powers.

In hisstatement to the same Assembly, Moussa Faki lamented that, “the frantic tendency to make decisions without real political will to implement them, has grown to such an extent that it has become devastating to our individual and collective credibility.” He noted that between 2021 and 2023, 93 percent of Assembly decisions were not implemented.

On the issue of elevating the AU’s voice at the international level, the experience of the OAU offers lessons for today. For example, the OAU coordinated a successful African boycott of apartheid South Africa, getting most members to sever relations, and even issue passports forbidding travel to South Africa. Those who did not implement the total package of sanctions drew the ire of public opinion and their stature waned considerably. Many made voluntary contributions toward the global anti-apartheid movement.

The OAU alsogave decisive leadership on conflict resolutionin South Africa and other countries emerging from colonialism and apartheid, like Angola, Cabo Verde, Mozambique, Namibia, and Zimbabwe. International actors, like the UN, the Commonwealth, and major powers, not only took their cues from the OAU but were careful to avoid being seen as working at cross-purposes.

The OAU forged a clear vision shared by members and kept the public informed and engaged.

To achieve these accomplishments, the OAU forged a clear vision shared by members, kept the public informed and engaged through its Pan African News Agency (PANAPRESS) and Union of National Radio and Television Organizations of Africa (URTNA), and engaged robustly with academic coalitions like the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA). It also used Africa’s representational strength at the UN to create initiatives like the UN Special Committee on Decolonization and the UN Council for Namibia.

The OAU was also skilled in mobilizing and keeping international public opinion engaged by working with these publics, governments, and legislatures. Though today’s context is different, these lessons are highly relevant and applicable to the AU as it confronts the challenges facing African countries and communities on the continent and the wider diaspora.

On the issue of how much sovereignty African countries should surrender to build a real political union, the AU could also borrow lessons from history. In November 2024, the seven members of the East African Community (EAC) signed an agreement and laid out a roadmap toexpedite the establishment of a political federationas the fourth and final step in EAC integration.

The East African regional body aims to recapture the momentum of the original EAC (before internal tensions led to its collapse in 1977). That version of the Community wason its way to a single authority. The original founders, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, shared an airline, harbor authority, railway, postal service, development bank, university (with three constituent colleges), and an integrated industrial strategy, based on each member’s unique advantages. A common services authority managed common institutions and services, bringing practical benefits to citizens. For example, a national in a member state could deposit money in one postal bank and have it delivered in less than 10 minutes to a recipient in another. The original EAC was run by a professionally staffed secretariat consisting of a cadre of administrative and technical staff as well as political appointees from each country. They took their guidance from the authority, which had the full confidence of the member states and could therefore work independently and professionally.

The success of this experiment lay in the Community developing the technocratic capacity to manage its affairs without losing the political vision of African unity and the defense of African interests. This was based on the idea that East Africans were better off as a unit as opposed to individual states.

While disorganization and inconsistent implementation of decisions persist, the AU still has an opportunity to become a more effective, influential, and institutionally sound continental political union as envisioned by the Founding Fathers. However, there is a pressing need to reevaluate its operations and functions to give it revitalized meaning and purpose. This will require political will, a shared mission, power-sharing between key institutions, and a sense of renewed urgency. Most of all, it requires strong citizen participation and ownership, as grand projects of this kind depend greatly on bottom-up pressure from below.

Martha Bakweseghaleads the Life & Peace Institute’s Horn of Africa Regional Programme based in Nairobi, Kenya. She regularly engages in regional and continental peace and security policy dialogues with the African Union and with the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). Ms. Bakwesegha is a conflict resolution practitioner with over 25 years of experience working on peace and security issues in Africa with various international organizations. The views expressed are her own.

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Based on reporting by ACSS