Seven Things to Know about Guinea’s Constitutional Referendum

Guinea’s constitutional referendum aims to cement the military junta’s grip on power and resist popular demands for a return to civilian, democratic rule.

Vendors work next to a billboard depicting Guinean junta leader, Mamadi Doumbouya, at a market in Conakry, days before the constitutional referendum on September 21, 2025. (Photo: AFP/Patrick Meinhardt)

A constitutional referendum in Guinea on September 21, 2025, seeks to shape the governance trajectory of this West African country of 14.8 million people. Administered by the military junta led byColonelMamadi Doumbouya, the referendum aims to validate and perpetuate the junta’s rule following its seizure of power in a coup against Guinea’s civilian and democratically elected government on September 5, 2021.

Here are seven issues that provide context to the referendum and its significance for Guinea.

Inits 2021 transitional charter, the junta promised to revert to civilian democratic rule and that junta leaders would not run in subsequent elections. However, the proposed constitution does not prohibit junta members from running—seemingly providing a pathway for Doumbouya and other junta leaders to perpetuate their rule.

The referendum aims to validate and perpetuate the junta’s rule.

In anAfrobarometer survey conducted between May and June of 2024, 67 percent of respondents said the country was headed in the wrong direction. In a reflection of Guineans’ long-standing commitment to democracy, 64 percent said they were against the military intervening to run the country. Furthermore, 56 percent said the military should return power to civilians as soon as possible, and 70 percent said democracy was preferable to any other form of government. Meanwhile, 84 percent were in favor of a two-term limit on the presidency.

Respondents to the Afrobarometer survey were also asked which party’s candidate they would vote for if the presidential election were held tomorrow. Only 1.3 percent said they would vote for Mamadi Doumbouya, and just 2.2 percent said they would vote for the junta’s candidate. On the other hand, 24 percent said they would vote for Alpha Condé’s Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée (RPG), and 17 percent said they would vote for Cellou Dalein Diallo’s Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG).

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The junta has consistently delayed taking steps to return power to elected civilian leaders. In theten-point transition timetableagreed to with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in December 2022—15 months after seizing power—the junta committed to ending the transition at the end of 2024. Yet, it failed to abide by this deadline.

Protests have been banned since 2022, suppressing popular dissent against the junta, which had derailed the country’s hard earned democratic processes. Meanwhile, Doumbouya’s portrait and posters touting his achievements line the streets of Conakry. Most vividly, asoccer tournamentfor the “General Mamadi Doumbouya Trophy” in late 2024, resulted in a stampede that killed 135 people. Artists and other supporters of the junta have posted on social media thecars the junta has reportedly gifted themfor their support.

Meanwhile, in October 2024,the junta dissolved dozens of small parties, suspended others, and placed the major opposition parties, including the RPG and the UFDG, “under observation.” Among other restrictions, opposition parties have been prevented from holding meetings and have had their bank accounts frozen. These suspensions have been repeatedly extended including in the month before the referendum.

In October 2024,Saadou Nimaga, former Chief of Staff at the Ministry of Mines under the government of Alpha Condé, was kidnapped and remains missing. In January 2025, opposition leader Aliou Bah was sentenced to 2 years in prison for “offending” Doumbouya.

Two civil society leaders from the Front national de défense de la constitution (FNDC), Oumar Sylla (also known as Foniké Mengué) and Mamadou Billo Bah, werekidnapped in July 2024 and remain missing.

This is a recurring pattern, withother civil society leaders facing kidnapping by armed men and torture. Abdoul Sacko, the coordinator for the civil society coalition “Forum des forces sociales de Guinée,” was kidnapped and tortured before being released in February 2025. Mohamed Traoré, the former head of the Guinean Bar Association, was similarly kidnapped and tortured before being released in June 2025.

Dissent within the junta is also not tolerated, as evidenced bythe mysterious death in prison of General Sadiba Koulibaly. The junta’s former “number two” and later ambassador to Cuba, Koulibaly died just days after being sentenced to 5 years in prison for apparently demanding the payment of embassy staff salaries in arrears.

Overall, more than 220 people have been killed for their dissent of the junta since 2021.

As a result of these killings and disappearances,many opposition leaders that remain in Guinea have gone into hiding. This has created an environment in which the referendum is not subject to critique or interrogation.

A major point of contention regarding the transition has been the junta’s decision to draft and adopt a new constitution prior to the return to democratic rule. Opposition members point out that, since the junta took power by force and failed to abide by its own transition timetable, its government is illegitimate as of January 2025. Moreover, while the junta did organize several rounds of consultations with the population, first in 2023, and then in 2024, the main opposition coalitions within civil society refused to participate, citing the process’ lack of legitimacy and the junta’s crackdown.

The document text was drafted by selected members of the junta’s transitional council (Conseil national de la transition) in an opaque fashion. The councilvoted to adopt the draft constitution in a closed session, where only some of the council members were able to read the final version before voting to approve it.

Since its creation in December 2021, the Cour de répression des infractions économiques et financières (CRIEF), the junta’s anticorruption court, has largely focused its investigations on former officials belonging to the opposition. Alpha Condé’s minister of defense, Mohamed Diané, was sentenced to 5 years in prison in December 2024. In early 2022, the junta ordered the seizure and destruction of houses owned by Cellou Dalein Diallo and Sidya Touré (the leaders of another opposition party). The move forced both into exile.

The CRIEF, meanwhile, has not investigated civil society reports of corruption inGuinea’s mining sector. This is particularly noteworthy given that the junta has signed deals to develop the world’s largest unexploited bauxite mine,Simandou,whilefreezing numerous other mining concessions.

In addition to removing the prohibition against junta members running for political office, theproposed constitutionprovides the junta amnesty under terms it can define for itself (Article 198).

The referendum also increases the presidential term from 5 to 7 years, renewable once.

Provisions creating a bicameral legislature have caused alarm because Article 103 stipulates that candidates for Parliament must be members of a legal political party. This effectively prevents opposition parties from participating, since they have been continuously suspended.

Riot police disperse pro-democracy protestors with tear gas. (Photo: AFP/Cellou Binani)

The proposed constitution, moreover, gives the executive branch authority over legislature since Article 110 states that a third of senators are selected by the president. The remaining are elected from among regional and communal councils that the junta has replaced with handpicked military officers. As such, the junta will effectively control the senate.

Other stipulations are that political candidates must be resident in Guinea, which appear aimed at excluding popular exiled leaders like Cellou Dalein Diallo and Alpha Condé. While provisions of the draft constitution specify that former presidents enjoy immunity for official acts, former President Condé has beencharged with multiple crimes.

Doumbouya replaced the country’s 34 civilian prefects with military officialsin 2022. Then in March 2024, hedissolved the country’s 342 municipal councilsand replaced all of the elected members with 3,000 appointees, in many cases military individuals. These officials are charged with organizing elections at the local level. In November 2024, the junta namednew neighborhood and district chiefsacross the country. For voting at the precinct level, neighborhood chiefs arecharged with distributing the voting cards that are required for citizens to vote.

In June 2025,Doumbouya issued a decree creating a “Direction Générale des Élections (DGE)” within the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization. This decree abolished the Commission électorale nationale indépendante (CENI), which had previously been responsible for organizing elections. The DGE’s authority is much larger than CENI’s. Not only does it organize elections but it is also responsible for interpreting and enforcing the rules it creates. Among other things, it is tasked with revising the electoral code, drafting laws and rules concerning the management of elections, and ensuring these rules are respected. Both thedirector and deputy director of the DGE are named by the president.

The junta will be in control over every stage of the referendum voting process.

Opposition parties have denounced the decree and the control it gives the executive over elections. Given that the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization is also the organ responsible for determining which political parties can operate, the executive branch is explicitly able to determine which parties can participate in the referendum campaign or future elections.

The referendum will be regulated by another ad hoc office within the ministry, the Observatoire national autonome de supervision du référendum constitutionnel (ONASUR). While the junta claims that ONASUR is independent, 6 of 11 members are chosen either by the president or by the Bureau of the Conseil National de la Transition, the junta’s legislative organ. Moreover, within each voting precinct, junta-appointed officials are responsible for vote counting and transmitting results up the chain.

Through this carefully orchestrated effort to align all key electoral mechanisms under the executive, the junta will be in control over every stage of the referendum voting process.

Reflective of the ad hoc nature in the rules surrounding the referendum, it is unclear what minimum level of voter participation must be reached for the referendum to have standing. In the text of the proposed constitution, the adoption of a referendum requires 50 percent participation (Article 70). Moreover, a constitutional referendum requires 60 percent of participation to be adopted (Article 192).

A protest against the ruling military junta in Conakry, October 20, 2022. (Photo: AFP/Cellou Binani)

According to the law passed by the junta’s transitional council to overseethisreferendum, however,no such participation threshold has been specified. This could conceivably allow the junta to declare a positive result from a simple majority of votes cast—even if voter participation falls far below 50 percent.

On September 3, the opposition coalition of the Forces vives de la Guinée, which includes the leading opposition parties of the UFDG and RPG as well as the FNDC civil society coalition called on voters toboycott the referendum, citing the lack of impartiality.

The junta has conducted a concerted campaign to restrict media coverage of political developments in Guinea, severely curtailing press freedom. According to Reporters without Borders,Guinea dropped 25 spotsin its annual Press Freedom Index, the largest drop of any country over the past year.

Since May 2023, several of the country’s most popular radio stations have been suspended or blocked from broadcasting. In May 2024, the media regulator, the Haute Autorité de communication (HAC), took the further step ofrevoking the operating licenses for four radio stations and two TV stations(Djoma FM, Espace FM, Sweet FM, FIM FM, Djoma TV, and Espace TV). These stations remain closed.

On December 3, 2024, reporterHabib Marouane Camara, the editor of the online outlet Le Révélateur 224, was abducted on his way to a meeting. He has not been heard from since.

While the HAC hasreversed its earlier ban on media from speaking with opposition parties, the HAC continues to restrict these exchanges, includingindefinitely suspending the private website Guinée Matinalong with its sister TV channel for “failing to respect equality, neutrality, and equilibrium principles during a referendum campaign.”

Given the limited media coverage on the substance of the referendum, it is unclear whether citizens know what it is they are voting on. While the junta hasorganized events to promote the proposed constitution, the absence of critical interrogation of the substance of the document raises uncertainty over citizens’ understanding.

Guinea’s referendum is occurring within a long history of citizen resistance to military rule. The 2021 coup is the third such military putsch since 1984. This follows 26 years of repressive rule by Guinea’s first president, Sékou Touré, in which as many as 50,000 citizens were killed by the country’s security forces. Operating in a constant state of paranoia, the Touré regime imprisoned many thousands of alleged opponents and drove more than a million Guineans into exile.

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After Touré’s death in 1984, Colonel Lansana Conté took over in a military coup and continued Touré’s heavy-handed style, if at a lower intensity. Accordingly, political life was still characterized by systematic repression of the opposition, including nearly 3,000 people killed in political violence between 1997 and 2008.

Captain Moussa Dadis Camara took over in another coup in December 2008, upon Conté’s death. Camara’s rule was also marked by arbitrary violence, repression, and corruption. Most seriously was the September 2009 “stadium massacre,” in which security forces killed more than 150 demonstrators and raped dozens of women who had assembled at the national stadium in Conakry to protest military rule.

Following a December 2009 assassination attempt that forced Camara into medical exile, General Sékouba Konaté oversaw a transition that culminated in the organization of the country’s first free and fair elections in 2010. The process led to the adoption of a constitution that for the first time included a strict two-term limit on the presidency and saw longtime opposition leader and democracy activist Alpha Condé elected as president in December 2010.

The decades of repressive rule had left Guinea one of the poorest countries in the world and marked by systematic state-based corruption and international isolation.

Seizing the democratic opening, Guinea saw major political and economic reforms over the next 10 years. GDP per capita improved from $659 in 2010 to $1,245 in 2021, and the population’s access to electricity improved from 28 percent to 47 percent.

Condé’scontroversial move to amend the constitution in 2019, also through a contentious referendum process, was met with widespread protests. These were violently repressed, enabling Condéto remain in office for a third term in 2020.

The aim of the process seems to be to offer the military junta a degree of legitimacy by which it can cement its hold on power.

The referendum process in Guinea appears to fall far short of electoral best practices for fairness, transparency, and participation. Rather, the aim of the process seems to be to offer the military junta a degree of legitimacy by which it can cement its hold on power—and extend the military’s dominant role in Guinean political life. In this way, the Guinean junta appears to want toreplicate the managed referendum processesthat followed coups in Chad and Gabon. The Guinean military’s push to retain power comes despite persistent popular demands for a return to civilian-led democratic government and against the backdrop of decades-long struggles between citizens and the military over the governance trajectory of the country.

Given Guinea’s history of violence, turbulent governance, and underdevelopment under previous extended periods of military government, the implications from this constitutional referendum are likely to profoundly impact Guinea’s political, economic, and security landscape for years to come.

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Based on reporting by ACSS