Mapping the Armed Actors in the Sudan Conflict

The SAF and the RSF operate as shifting coalitions of armed groups rather than unified organizational structures, impacting not only the course of the war but also the challenges for post-conflict stability.

The conflict in Sudan is regularly presented as a contest between two militaries—the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This obscures the accelerating fragmentation of the security space in Sudan. There are now an estimated 150 militias active in the conflict. Comprising a collection of military and paramilitary forces, tribal militias, Islamist brigades, community defense groups, criminal gangs, and foreign mercenaries, these armed actors represent a wide range of motivations, chains of command, organizational structures, and professional training.

Sudan has a long history of central authorities using militias to outsource their security agenda.

Sudan has a long history of central authorities using militias to outsource their security agenda. In 1983, President Gaafar Nimeiri armed Arab pastoralist militias, such as the Misseriya, to fight against the secessionist Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in the south. In the 2000s, Sudanese leader, Omar al-Bashir, formed the infamous Janjaweed Arab militias to crush non-Arab groups in Darfur resisting political and economic exclusion. This systematic use of armed militias has fueled the growing fragmentation and deprofessionalization of Sudan’s security sector. It has also reshaped the political landscape as these armed groups have leveraged their security role to expand their political influence. The current competition for supremacy between the SAF and the RSF is an ongoing outcome of this fragmentation.

Both the RSF and the SAF are backing dozens of militias to advance the core belligerents’ military and political objectives. The increasingly transactional nature of these deals is fostering a series of defections and constantly shifting coalitions. This is simultaneously incentivizing predatory behavior by armed militias that are capturing revenues from gold smuggling, livestock raiding, looting, and control of key land and transit routes. This is creating further local drivers of the conflict.

Notwithstanding the criticalrole that external actors are playing in the Sudan conflict, the internal fragmentation of Sudan’s security environment holds far-reaching implications for the war’s trajectory—including the security, political, and economic challenges that will shape the post-conflict landscape. Mapping the current configuration of armed groups in Sudan provides a reference point for tracking this complexity and the competing interests vying for control within each of the two main military blocs.

Soldiers in support of various units of the Sudan Armed Forces assemble at a graduation ceremony after completing a training. (Photo: AFP/Ebrahim Hamid)

Reflective of the tenuous lines of command within the SAF coalition, there have been clashes among the various SAF-aligned armed groups.

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Rapid Support Forces’ “technicals” mounted with machine guns and anti-aircraft weapons (Photo: AFP/ Yasuyoshi Chiba).

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A review of the composition of the two armed coalitions in Sudan indicates some similarities and notable differences. Both the SAF and RSF are organized around military structures that predate the current conflict. Whereas the largest contingent of forces supporting the SAF come from the legacy military, the RSF is composed almost entirely of Arab tribal militias. These core RSF forces have been fighting together for decades, tracing back to their days as the Janjaweed. This has helped the RSF to offset the overall numerical advantage in force size that the SAF can mobilize.

The composition of the SAF coalition has changed substantially over the course of the war as it has increasingly relied on militias. A notable difference with the RSF is the SAF’s expanding use of Islamist militias, harkening back to the NIF influence of the Bashir era. By contrast, the RSF has relied more heavily on foreign mercenaries.

Both the SAF and RSF have established political wings … in neither case are these civilian components very deep or representative.

The SAF has repeatedly stated that it is working to establish a unified chain of command over its disparate elements with the aim of creating more oversight and accountability for the actions of these forces. The RSF has seemingly not made establishing a structured chain a command a priority. This aligns with the more fragmented nature of the RSF coalition and the limited acknowledgements of accountability for the widespread reports of looting and human rights violations committed by the RSF-aligned forces.

Given their respective fractious coalitions, both the SAF and RSF encounter persistent intra-coalition fighting that contributes to the instability and unpredictability of the trajectory of this conflict.

Both the SAF and RSF have established political wings as they represent themselves as viable governing authorities. While these political elements comprise some civilians, in neither case are these civilian components very deep or representative. Both the SAF and RSF draw nearly all of their support from armed groups. Furthermore, the civilian arms of the SAF and RSF are subservient to the respective military leadership structures, underscoring the military focus of both coalitions.

While the conflict is commonly framed as a competition between two warring armed factions, this overlooks the extensive networks of civilian organizations that are a distinguishing feature of Sudanese society. Comprising a wide range of political, civic, professional, and community groups, these civilian actors see themselves as the embodiment of the ongoing 2019 revolution, envisaging a democratic Sudan accountable to the interests of citizens. While lacking a single, cohesive organizing structure, many of these groups remain active throughout Sudan in providing local governance, social services, and mediation roles. They are also actively pursuing pathways to a resolution of the conflict that leads to stable, cohesive Sudan.

National political organizations.These include political parties and national civic alliances aiming to articulate a vision of and structure for a civilian-led transitional and permanent government in Sudan. The most well-known of these is Somoud (Civil Democratic Alliance) led by former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. Representing a broad-based coalition of 300 organizations, it has endorsed a set of principles around creating a unified and democratic Sudanese state based on a decentralized federal system that separates religion and state and establishes equal citizenship as the basis for rights and duties.

Professional Organizations.These include assorted networks of doctors, lawyers, business owners, and journalists that were key elements of the 2019 revolution and that continue to advocate for democracy, transparency, and merit-based governance reforms. These groups are well connected to the Sudanese diaspora as well as to international professional associations, drawing attention to the situation in Sudan.

Sudanese volunteers prepare free meals for some of residents of El Fasher in August 2025. (Photo: AFP)

Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs).These include grassroots, community-led networks of an estimated 26,000 individuals that emerged during the war to provide health care, food assistance, education, and psychosocial support across all 18 states. Building on local traditions of mutual aid, ERRs have assisted millions and have gained extensive credibility among Sudanese civilians. They represent a service-oriented local governance system that is held up as a model for a future Sudan government.

Resistance Committees.These include neighborhood-based, grassroots pro-democracy groups that initially spearheaded the 2019 revolution. While they often remain independent from national political negotiations, they form the backbone of local mutual aid and antiwar activism.

Civic Groups.These include a wide range of community associations, comprising elders’ committees, youth groups, women’s alliances, and others focused on peacebuilding, economic development, and advocating for justice and accountability in Sudan.

Civil Democratic Alliance for Revolutionary Forces (Somoud)Leadership: Abdalla HamdokSize: 300 participants and organizations

Sudan Civic Convergence Tracks (SCCT)Leadership: N/ASize: 40 diverse organizations, civil society, and political actors

Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs)Leadership: variousSize: 26,000 members

Resistance Committees*Leadership: N/ASize: 5,000+ committees across the country

Democratic Civil Society Platform

Professional and Trade Unions CoordinationLeadership: Taha Osman

Unionist Alliance*Leadership: Babiker Faisal

The Coalition of Eastern Sudan Civil Forces*

Sudanese Declaration of Principles for Building a New Homeland Alliance

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement Revolutionary Democratic Current (SPLM/RDC)*

Intellectual Issues Center and Journal*

Sudanese Congress Party*Leadership: Omar Al-Digeir

National Umma Party*Leadership: Al-Wathiq Al-Berier (Secretary-General)

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North (Revolutionary Democratic Current)*Leadership: Yasir Arman

National Ba’ath Party*Leadership: Kamal Boulad

Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party*Leadership: Ali Al-Rih Al-Sanhouri

The People’s Congress PartyLeadership: Dr. Ali El Hajj

Ba’ath PartyLeadership: Mohamed Zia El Din

The Unified National Unionist Party *

Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A- WA)*Leadership: Abdul Wahid Al Nour

Community leadersWomen, elders, IDP camp representative

Local Administrations in the Darfur Region

Elders and Mediation Committee of El Fasher (ECM)Leadership: variousSize:  28 members, including religious actors, health practitioners, university representatives, and other social groups (women, Arab-identifying representatives, herders, and farmers).Location: North Darfur

Committee for Evacuation of Wounded/Burial of the Dead

Committee led by a business, tribal, religious leaders, local authorities, and civilians(doctors, teachers and journalists)Location: East Darfur

Mechanism for Ceasing Hostilities and Peaceful Coexistence in South KordofanLocation: South Kordofan

Youth Without BordersDistributors of humanitarian aid in KadugliLocation: South Kordofan

Youth for Our CountryA charity organization implementing programs for IDPsLocation: South Kordofan

Together for DillingA youth-led initiative that aimed to spread the culture of peace in the regionLocation: South Kordofan

This snapshot of key actors operating in Sudan highlights the fragmented nature of both belligerent camps as well as the alliances of civilian actors attempting to advance a nonviolent and civilian-led alternative.Civilians, meanwhile, have been the frequent targets of elements of both belligerent factions—including the seizure of property, ethnically motivated violence, extortion, detentions, and assassinations aimed at weakening civilian civic and political leadership.

The growing incentivization of armed actors toward revenue capture and other criminal activities is deepening self-perpetuating drivers of the conflict.

The increasing fragmentation of the two military coalitions underscores the challenges underlying negotiating a ceasefire and transitioning to a stable state. The growing incentivization of armed actors toward revenue capture and other criminal activities is deepening self-perpetuating drivers of the conflict. These complexities and the expansive geographic spread of the conflict mean that navigating any prospective ceasefire, disarmament, and demobilization process will likely unfold at multiple levels and in stages.

How these respective fragmented coalitions evolve and engage with one another will be instrumental for determining the contours of a future Sudanese state, its capability to retain national sovereignty, and rebuilding cohesive national institutions that are representative and responsive to citizen interests.

Based on reporting by ACSS