investigation
Imagine you could build a newsroom — a fully functioning news website, complete with articles, images, and a steady stream of daily content — for less than the cost of a monthly Netflix subscription.
Now imagine building 150 of them. All publishing fake stories. All designed to look like your local newspaper. All running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with no human writers required.
This is not a thought experiment. This is what Russia has built. And AI made it possible.
$105 Per Year
In 2024, Wall Street Journal reporter Jack Brewster demonstrated that a fully automated fake news website — one that generates articles, publishes them on schedule, and maintains a realistic appearance — could be operated for approximately 105 US dollars per year using ChatGPT and basic web hosting.
One hundred and five dollars. That is the cost of industrialized deception in the age of AI.
Russia understood this before almost anyone else. According to analysis by Recorded Future, a Russia-linked operation called CopyCop was identified using large language models to "weaponize influence content at scale." The operation used ChatGPT and similar tools to rewrite and customize articles from legitimate news sources, stripping the original reporting of context and injecting pro-Russian narratives.
The fake websites copied the layouts, design, and domain structures of legitimate media outlets. A reader in Berlin might click on what appears to be a Spiegel article. A reader in Paris might see what looks like a report from Le Monde. The content is fabricated. The source is Moscow.
Operation Doppelganger
Meta, the parent company of Facebook, called it "the largest and most persistent influence operation" it had ever discovered on its platform.
Operation Doppelganger, first uncovered in the summer of 2022, is a systematic and sophisticated online campaign orchestrated by Russian state-affiliated actors. It targets social media users primarily in Ukraine, the United States, Germany, and France — but its reach extends far beyond.
The campaign works like a factory assembly line:
Step 1: Clone. The operatives create fake versions of prominent Western news outlets — Spiegel, Welt, Sueddeutsche in Germany; major outlets across France and the UK. The fake sites replicate the real outlets' layout, design, and visual style down to the smallest detail.
Step 2: Fabricate. Using AI tools — primarily ChatGPT — the operatives generate articles about Ukraine, Western military aid, and European politics. The articles are designed to erode public support for Ukraine, discredit Western governments, and amplify social divisions.
Step 3: Distribute. The fake articles are pushed through a network of automated social media accounts — bots and trolls — using advanced obfuscation tactics. Social media preview images are manipulated so that when a link is shared, it appears to come from the real news outlet.
Step 4: Scale. In January 2024 alone, the German Foreign Office revealed the discovery of over 50,000 fake social media profiles on X linked to the Doppelganger operation. Fifty thousand accounts, created in a single month, all spreading fabricated news in the style of legitimate media.
The European External Action Service (EEAS) found that 7 legitimate media outlets were impersonated, while 47 other inauthentic news outlets were created to promote the operation's content. OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, confirmed that Doppelganger actors had purchased several ChatGPT accounts "through five separate email addresses with the aim to generate and edit content."
The African Extension
Russia's disinformation factory does not stop at European borders. The same machinery — the same techniques, the same AI tools, the same playbook — has been extended to Africa.
According to the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, Russian influence campaigns on the continent increased fourfold between 2022 and 2024. While the AI component of these campaigns in Africa has been less systematically studied than in Europe, the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung's 2025 study found that the same patterns are emerging.
In the Central African Republic, a former Wagner media operative went public in November 2024 about Russian disinformation operations — describing how Russia's information service recruited local journalists and created propaganda content that was distributed through state media, Russian-funded radio stations, and social media networks.
In South Africa, researchers found that local "buzzer" accounts — social media users who post pro-Russian content at "industrial levels" — were being coordinated to amplify Russian narratives. In interviews, South African influencers reported being approached by Russian operatives and offered "pre-packaged video" to amplify.
In the Sahel — Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger — Russia's Africa Corps (the successor to Wagner) operates alongside an information warfare apparatus that includes RT Afrique, Sputnik Afrique, and a network of pro-Russian websites and social media accounts.
The Deeper Threat
The cost structure tells the story. When a fake newsroom costs $105 per year to operate, the economics of disinformation become terrifying.
A nation-state actor with Russia's resources can operate thousands of fake news websites simultaneously. Each one can generate hundreds of articles per day. Each article can be automatically translated into dozens of languages. Each translation can be distributed through networks of bot accounts that number in the tens of thousands.
The result is not a single lie that can be fact-checked and debunked. It is a flood — an overwhelming volume of misleading content that drowns out legitimate journalism, exhausts fact-checkers, and creates a permanent fog of uncertainty in public discourse.
This is Russia's strategy. Not to convince anyone of a specific lie, but to destroy the very possibility of shared truth. As the researchers note: "GenAI heralds a new era of fakes that eventually might be indistinguishable" from genuine content. And AI-powered disinformation has already "added new power to the age-old question of what is truth, authenticity and facts."
For Africa, where 84% of people rely on social media for news — and where independent media is under pressure in country after country — this factory of fabrication poses an existential threat to democratic discourse.
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This investigation draws on research by Recorded Future, the European External Action Service, Meta, OpenAI, the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, the German Federal Foreign Office, and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung's 2025 study on AI-Generated Disinformation in Europe and Africa.
Revvmark is an independent investigation platform. Read more at revvmark.com
Based on reporting by REVVMARK